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Abstract  
Purpose - It is common practice for companies to disclose earnings measures and other financial 
information, which is not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice such as 
(referred to as non-GAAP earnings and non-GAAP financial information).  The New Zealand Financial 
Markets Authority (FMA) introduced a Guidance Note in 2012 to improve disclosure of non-GAAP 
information.  This study investigates the effect of those guidelines on the number of New Zealand listed 
companies reporting non-GAAP earnings and the quality of non-GAAP earnings information disclosed. 
Design/methodology/approach - A disclosure and prominence index are created to measure any 
change in company’s compliance with the FMA guidance on the presentation of non-GAAP 
information and the level of prominence given to non-GAAP earnings.  
Findings - The findings show that the guidelines, despite not being mandatory, are modifying corporate 
disclosure behaviour. Companies have improved the way they disclose non-GAAP earnings 
information and there has been a reduction in the emphasis given to non-GAAP earnings as opposed to 
audited statutory profit. However, the study also highlights areas for improvement, including the depth 
of explanation of non-GAAP earnings calculations and adjustments, and concern about multiple non-
GAAP earnings measures used to explain performance. 
Originality/value - There has been no academic research on the impact of the FMA Guidance Note 
on company disclosure practice. This study contributes to the developing research on non-GAAP 
earnings by extending the research to a small country with different institutional and market features 
and policy responses to disclosure of non-GAAP earnings  
Keywords – non-GAAP earnings, disclosure, FMA Guidance Note 
Paper type Research paper 
 
1. Introduction 
New Zealand listed companies have been reporting non-GAAP earnings measures that are not 
determined according to generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) earnings for a number of years 
(Rainsbury et al., 2015).  Non-GAAP earnings are disclosed by senior management in annual reports 
and other communications.  Managers are free to use alternative measures of performance without 
applying common standards, as there are for reporting GAAP earnings, which has raised concerns about 
the appropriateness of their use and the transparency of the information disclosed (FMA, 2012).  
Regulators acknowledge that while non-GAAP earnings may provide more information to markets there 
is the potential for managers to report opportunistically which may mislead investors and undermine 
market confidence (FMA, 2012; International Organisation of Securities Commissions, 2014; European 
Securities and Markets Authority, 2015).  Consequently in various jurisdictions regulators have 
introduced regulations, recommendations or guidelines for issuers to follow when disclosing non-
GAAP earnings. 
In 2012, the New Zealand Financial Markets Authority (FMA) introduced a Guidance Note on 
the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings information for listed companies effective from 1 January 2013.  
The aim of the guidelines is to promote meaningful communication of financial information to users 
and reduce the potential for non-GAAP information to be misleading (FMA, 2012).  Non-GAAP 
earnings measures: (1) should not be given undue prominence in investor communications, (2) are to 
be reconciled to the audited GAAP earnings, and (3) are to be unbiased and calculated consistently from 
period to period (FMA, 2012).   
This paper investigates the effect of the Guidance Note on the number of companies reporting 
non-GAAP earnings and on the quality of non-GAAP earnings information disclosed.   
This study contributes to the developing research on non-GAAP earnings in different countries.  
Research on non-GAAP earnings has been predominantly conducted in the United States, however, 
institutional and market features may differ from country to country which may change managers’ 
incentives to report non-GAAP earnings (Isidro and Marques, 2015).  In this respect, capital market 
regulators responses differed in terms of the policy approaches taken to improve the disclosure of non-
GAAP earnings information.  In larger jurisdictions, such as the United States, regulations were 
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introduced to improve reporting while in smaller jurisdictions, such as Australia and New Zealand, 
guidelines have been introduced.  Although New Zealand’s share market is small by international 
standards, it is appropriate to examine the impact of the policy approach taken by the FMA on 
influencing the reporting of non-GAAP earning measures in New Zealand given the potential for non-
GAAP earnings to be used opportunistically by companies to mislead investors.  To date, there has been 
little research on the impact of guidelines compared with regulations to improve disclosure of non-
GAAP information.  Similarly, there has been no independent academic research on the impact of the 
New Zealand FMA Guidance Note.  
The study finds that the FMA Guidance Note has had little impact on reducing the number of 
companies disclosing non-GAAP earnings.  The disclosure of non-GAAP earnings information as 
guided by the FMA has improved for New Zealand listed companies between 2012 and 2014.  In 
addition, firms now give less prominence to non-GAAP earnings compared with audited earnings.  
However, there are concerns about the various definitions and terms used for non-GAAP earnings 
which may make it difficult for users to compare non-GAAP earnings over time and between 
companies.  The conclusion is that the Guidance Note has had an influence in improving disclosure 
practices.  
Section Two of the paper gives background research on non-GAAP earnings and a summary 
of capital market regulators policy approaches relating to the disclosure of non-GAAP information.  
Section Three poses the research questions and Section Four provides a description of the sample and 
research method.  The results and discussion are presented in Section Five and Section Six presents the 
conclusions.  
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Background 
Research on voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP earnings shows that it is a means of communicating 
information about firm performance in order to improve the predictability of financial results 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Graham et al., 2005).  Research studies show that managers remove 
temporary or one-off items from earnings to provide information about core earnings to assist with 
predicting long-term performance and future cash flows (Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Black and 
Christensen, 2009).  Research also suggests that non-GAAP measures are used by managers to inform 
the market when GAAP earnings are less informative, such as for technology firms and firms with prior 
losses (Bowen et al., 2005; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004).   
However, research findings also show that non-GAAP earnings are disclosed to enhance firm 
performance such as to meet earnings benchmarks.  Graham et al. (2005) show that managers consider 
it very important for current earnings to meet earnings benchmarks in order to build credibility in the 
capital market, to maintain and increase share prices and build the external reputation of management.  
Not meeting these benchmarks creates uncertainty for stakeholders about the future prospects of the 
company. Research studies find that managers select non-GAAP earnings measures to increase 
earnings, smooth earnings or to meet analyst’s forecasts to convey a more favourable impression of 
firm performance (Bowen et al., 2005).  Research studies find evidence of non-GAAP earnings 
measures that: (1) exclude recurring expense items (Black and Christensen, 2009; Barth et al., 2012), 
(2) reclassify recurring items as transitory (Kolev et al., 2008), and (3) include transitory gains 
(Baumker et al., 2014). Strategies are also used by managers to emphasise non-GAAP earnings in press 
releases when GAAP earnings fall short of strategic benchmarks in order to emphasise a positive 
performance (Marques, 2010). 
Reporting non-GAAP earnings to enhance perceptions of performance can affect unsophisticated 
investors adversely as they are more likely to assess earnings and stock performance as being higher 
(based on a higher disclosed non-GAAP earnings) and trade on this information, while sophisticated 
investors do not (Fredrickson and Miller, 2004; Elliot, 2006; Bhattacharya et al., 2007).  
 
2.2 Regulators’ Responses   
Given the potential of non-GAAP earnings to impact the market both favourably and unfavourably, 
regulators have taken different approaches to implementing requirements for the growing number of 
listed companies reporting non-GAAP earnings.  
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In Australia and New Zealand, market regulators have issued guidelines for voluntary 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings. In September 2012, New Zealand’s FMA released a Guidance Note 
on the disclosure of non-GAAP financial information for issuers, directors, and preparers of financial 
information.  The Guidance Note defines non-GAAP information and the range of corporate 
communications to which it is to apply. Its purpose is to provide meaningful financial information to 
the market, to ensure that non-GAAP financial information is not misleading.  
The ten disclosure guidelines in the Guidance Note are listed in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
The first principle is that directors explain why the measure is provided and how it is useful to 
investors. Non-GAAP figures are not to be given prominence over GAAP earnings and to be 
appropriately labelled to distinguish them from GAAP information.   
Non-GAAP earnings need to be defined, for example, EBIT (earnings before interest and 
taxation), so that users can understand how it is calculated and reconciled to GAAP earnings.  
Calculations must be consistent from year to year and prior year comparatives need to be provided along 
with a statement as whether they were extracted from the audited or reviewed financial statements.  
Non-GAAP earnings must be reconciled to net profit after tax and significant adjustments cross-
referenced to the financial statements.  In communicating non-GAAP earnings a clear statement is to 
be made if the financial information has been taken from reviewed or audited financial statements.  
The Australian Securities and Investment Commission’s Regulatory Guide 230 (ASIC, 2011) 
does not allow non-GAAP earnings to be disclosed on the face of the income statement.  Non-GAAP 
earnings are permitted in other corporate communications, such as directors’ reports, press releases, and 
analyst briefings, but they must not be misleading or be given greater prominence than GAAP financial 
information.  Non-GAAP earnings are to be calculated consistently from period to period and 
comparative figures provided.  A reconciliation between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings is also 
required along with explanations of the adjustments.  
In the United States and Europe, stricter regulatory approaches exist. In March 2003, the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued SEC Regulation G (SEC, 2003) requiring 
any public company that discloses a non-GAAP financial measure to provide (1) a directly comparable 
GAAP measure; and (2) to reconcile the differences between the non-GAAP measure and the GAAP 
measure.  Firms must also give reasons why management considers the non-GAAP information to be 
useful to investors and the additional purposes for which the financial measure is used.  
In Europe recommendations governing reporting of non-GAAP earnings were issued in 2005 by 
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) (now the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA)).  In 2015, ESMA revised the guidelines to overcome disclosure weaknesses 
including the use of uncommon non-GAAP measures, non-GAAP measures not being defined and 
reported in a biased manner.  
The revised guidelines are intended to be mandatory.  The level of disclosure will be increased 
to promote transparency, neutrality and comparability of information provided to users.  All non-GAAP 
earnings measures are to be defined and applied consistently and the relevance of the measure explained 
to users.  Adjustments to earnings are to be explained and prior year comparative figures provided.  
Non-GAAP earnings are to be displayed with less prominence than GAAP measures and must be 
reconciled to the financial statements.   
 
2.3 Impact of Regulators’ Responses 
The introduction of disclosure regulations in the United States has resulted in improved practices.  There 
has been a decline in the number of companies reporting non-GAAP earnings that exceed GAAP 
earnings (Entwistle et al., 2006), and that beat analyst forecasts (Heflin and Hsu, 2008).  Companies 
also give less emphasis to discussing non-GAAP earnings in press releases (Entwistle et al., 2006).  The 
quality of items excluded from non-GAAP earnings has improved.  Excluded items are more transitory 
and not part of core earnings (Kolev et al., 2008) signifying that the primary motivation of managers 
for disclosing non-GAAP earnings is to inform the market (Curtis et al., 2014).  Higher quality 
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reconciliations between the non-GAAP earnings and the GAAP figures are also found to reduce 
mispricing of securities (Zhang and Zheng, 2011). 
Market reaction to non-GAAP earnings is higher in the post-regulation period indicating that 
investors are more confident in the reporting, but they are more sensitive to aggressive (benchmark-
beating) reporting (Black et al., 2012).  Overall the US research indicates that SEC Regulation G has 
had a positive impact on the quality of non-GAAP disclosures, although there is still evidence of 
opportunistic behaviour (Baumaker et al., 2014). 
There has been limited research on the impact of the European recommendations.  One study 
finds that the recommendations have had little impact on disclosure practices in non-GAAP earnings in 
press releases for a sample of large companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Hitz, 2010). 
Nonetheless, high quality non-GAAP earnings reconciliations are found to reduce the mispricing of 
securities for a sample of companies listed on the Euro STOXX Fixed Index (Aubert and Grudnitski, 
2014) 
To date, no research is available on the impact of the ASIC guidelines.  Prior to the 
implementation of the guidelines, Cameron et al. (2012) examine the emphasis given to GAAP versus 
non-GAAP earnings in annual reports of listed companies from 2007-2009.  Non-GAAP earnings are 
emphasised in preference to statutory profit and in sixty per cent of cases non-GAAP earnings are higher 
than audited earnings.  They conclude that “impression management” is the most common motivation 
for managers to emphasise non-GAAP earnings.   
 
3. Research Questions  
The first research question focuses on the impact of the FMA Guidance Note on the number of 
companies reporting non-GAAP earnings.  The implementation of SEC Regulation G in the United 
States resulted in a drop in the number of companies reporting non-GAAP earnings but the decline was 
temporary (Brown et al., 2012).  Today non-GAAP earnings are used widely.  For example, Larcker 
and Tayan (2010) document that around half of the companies listed in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average Index reported adjusted earnings.  
In New Zealand, the FMA does not prohibit the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings and companies 
not following the FMA Guidance Note will not necessarily breach the law (FMA, 2012).  It is, therefore, 
unclear what impact the FMA Guidance Note will have on the number of companies reporting non-
GAAP earnings.  
The first research question is:  
Has the reporting of non-GAAP earnings by New Zealand listed companies declined since 2013?   
 
The FMA guidelines apply to disclosures of non-GAAP earnings in annual reports (excluding 
the financial statements), market announcements, and presentations to analysts or investors.  The second 
research question examines whether the introduction of the FMA Guidelines has impacted corporate 
disclosure behaviour.  
The second research question is:  
Has the disclosure of non-GAAP information in annual reports changed after 2013? 
 
4. Sample and Research Method  
The population consists of all firms listed on New Zealand’s stock exchange (NZX) in 2014, the year 
the Guidance Note was introduced.  Listed companies that disclosed non-GAAP earnings from 2012 to 
2014 are identified.  The three-year period covers one year prior to and after the implementation of the 
Guidance Note in 2013.  A period of three years is considered long enough to be able to assess any 
changes in disclosures as an extended time series may be impacted by a number of other factors (Heflin 
and Hsu, 2008).   
From the 2014 NZX population, 114 listed companies are selected.  Six companies are excluded 
– three companies delisted, two were overseas companies and one lacked sufficient information – 
resulting in a final sample of 108 companies (see Table 2). The initial sample of 108 drops to 104 
companies in 2013 and 99 companies in 2012 due to changes in company listings.  A total of 311 annual 
reports are examined and 57 companies identified as reporting non-GAAP earnings for each year from 
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2012 to 2014.  This number of companies represented is between 53 to 58% of the total number of NZX 
companies in each year. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Non-GAAP earnings information is hand collected from the annual reports of each company. 
Annual reports were selected as they include financial reports which are an important source of 
information for investors, lenders and regulators.  In a recent survey, users of financial statements relied 
on the financial statements and management commentary and analysis including directors’ reports XRB 
(2016).  
The data was collected from various sections of the annual report including reports of the Board 
and Managing Director as well as performance highlights and financial summaries. In a limited number 
of cases, non-GAAP earnings information such as reconciliations with GAAP earnings were included 
in the audited financial statements.  
The FMA definition of non-GAAP earnings: “non-GAAP …profit information calculated on a 
basis other than GAAP or calculated in accordance with GAAP and then adjusted” (FMA, p.5), is 
applied in collecting the data: Examples of non-GAAP earnings include operating earnings figures such 
as earnings before interest and taxation and adjustments made to the statutory earnings i.e. net profit 
after tax prepared in accordance with GAAP, to determine underlying or normalised earnings.  
Non-GAAP earnings disclosures are evaluated against the FMA Guidance Note using a 
disclosure index.  Disclosure indices are a valid research tool and are used widely in accounting 
research (Botosan, 1997; Hooks and van Staden, 2011).  The limitations of disclosure indices centre on 
recognition and measurement issues i.e., what disclosures to include in an index and how to define and 
assess disclosure quality (Botosan, 2004; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008).  For this index, these limitations 
are mitigated in the following ways:  Firstly, the selection of disclosure items to be included in the index 
is defined in terms of the FMA Guidance Note.  Secondly, although the FMA Guidance Note applies 
to disclosures in a range of investor communications, the context is limited to non-GAAP earnings 
information provided in annual reports such as directors’ or management commentary. Thirdly, 
subjectivity in coding is reduced by referring to the Guidance Note and disclosure illustrations produced 
by the FMA. 
The Disclosure Index is shown in Appendix One.  Each of the FMA Guidelines as shown in Table 
1 is measured and a disclosure score calculated for the 57 non-GAAP earnings disclosing companies.  
Appendix One provides references to the relevant literature to support the measure.  In most cases the 
scoring is straightforward with a binary score of 1 used to indicate compliance with the guidelines and 
zero for non-compliance.  For example, ‘consistent calculation’ (Appendix One, criterion 5) is coded 1 
if a consistent approach is applied to the calculation of non-GAAP information or 0 if it is not.  A higher 
score for the index indicates greater compliance with the guidelines with a maximum score of 10. 
‘Lack of prominence’ (Table 1, Criterion 2) is more complex and is measured separately applying 
an approach used by Entwistle et al. (2006).  The scale is shown in Appendix Two with scores ranging 
between 1 and 4.  A score of 1 indicates that high prominence is given to non-GAAP earnings, such as 
when the non-GAAP earnings number is reported in a headline, without reference to GAAP earnings.  
A score of 4 indicates discussion about GAAP earnings with non-GAAP earnings having secondary 
importance.  
The overall maximum score is 14: (10 for compliance and 4 for prominence).  Two researchers 
independently grade the disclosures with any differences reconciled to agree on a final score.  
 
5. Results and Discussion 
Table 2 indicates that the percentage of listed companies reporting non-GAAP earnings remained fairly 
stable over the three year period, suggesting that the FMA Guidance Notes has had little impact on the 
frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures.  This result contrasts with the impact of SEC Regulation 
G in the United States where the number of companies reporting non-GAAP earnings declined 
(Entwistle et al., 2006; Heflin and Hsu, 2008)  
Table 3 summarises descriptive statistics. Panel A covers the 57 companies that consistently 
reported non-GAAP earnings and Panel B covers the 51 companies that did not.  Companies 
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consistently reporting non-GAAP earnings are statistically significantly larger and more profitable 
compared with those that did not.  Companies disclosing non-GAAP earnings incur a lower percentage 
of losses and lower gearing compared with other companies, but the differences are not significant (at 
the 5% level).  However, an analysis by industry shows that the differences in firm characteristics are 
driven by companies in the energy and property sectors. The majority of companies reporting (not 
reporting) non-GAAP earnings provide services and there are no significant differences in firm 
characteristics between these two sub-groups.  These results are contrary to research in the United States 
which finds that disclosure of non-GAAP information is more likely for younger companies, companies 
that incur losses, and companies with high growth, high leverage and high book to market ratios 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2004).   
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Table 4 reports the total disclosure (Panel A) and prominence scores (Panel B) for the 57 
companies reporting non-GAAP earnings over the three year period.  (Scores by individual company 
are available on request).   
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
The disclosure score mean (median) increased from 5.89 (6.00) in 2012 to 7.26 (7.00) in 2014 
indicating a significant (1% level) improvement in compliance over that time.  The prominence given 
to GAAP earnings compared with non-GAAP earnings from 2012 to 2014 has also improved.  The 
mean prominence score has improved significantly (1% level) from 2.49 in 2012 to 2.74 in 2014 
indicating that equal or greater prominence is given to the GAAP.  An analysis of the disclosure and 
prominence means by industry indicates no significant differences.  It is notable that the improvement 
in prominence occurred between 2013 and 2014, the year the FMA Guidance Note was made effective. 
Although there was media attention about the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings during 2012 to 2014 
which may have influenced corporate behaviour it would appear that the Guidance Note has had a 
positive impact on disclosure practice.   
The New Zealand results are consistent with the impact of SEC Regulation G on reporting of 
non-GAAP information in market announcements (press releases) in improving prominence in the 
reporting of GAAP earnings relative to non-GAAP earnings (Marques, 2010). However, CESR 
recommendations did not reduce the prominence given to non-GAAP earnings relative to GAAP 
earnings in market announcements for a sample of German listed companies (Hitz, 2010). 
Table 5 provides more details of the disclosure scores.   
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
Table 5 Panel A gives a break-down of the disclosure scores by category.  Areas of strength are 
that non-GAAP earnings are labelled clearly, calculated consistently and comparatives provided for the 
non-GAAP adjustments.  However, director justifications for disclosing non-GAAP earnings and 
explanations and calculations of adjustments to GAAP earnings are lacking.  Disclosures also lack any 
reference to whether the information provided is reviewed or audited.  
Table 5, Panel B indicates directors’ explanations of why disclosing non-GAAP earnings is useful 
information.  The most common justification is that non-GAAP earnings figures are useful to investors 
and/or other users.  Other common reasons are that non-GAAP earnings are a better measure of 
operations and core business results; that they are used to assess dividend distributions, debt covenant 
requirements and by management for internal reporting purposes.   
Table 5 Panel C provides the number of instances where the calculations behind the non-GAAP 
earnings figure are explained.  While companies are justifying the use of non-GAAP earnings measures, 
the findings highlight a lack of explanation by management of why adjustments to GAAP earnings are 
being made.  Justifying why items are excluded would enable investors to assess the reasonableness of 
the treatment (Young, 2014).  It is difficult to see how the alternative measures improve understanding 
of performance unless the purpose and nature of the measures used are clearly defined. 
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Managers have a great deal of flexibility in what non-GAAP earnings measures to use and as a 
result, there is a lack of standardisation in the measurement and labelling of non-GAAP earnings. The 
study shows a variety of measures and different labels are used for non-GAAP earnings.  This may be 
appropriate in order to allow companies to report performance in a way that is suitable to the business 
but the customisation of earnings measures may cause confusion for investors in comparing non-GAAP 
earnings across firms and over time. In 2014, 26 of the 57 companies reported more than one non-
GAAP earnings performance measure.  In one case, a company emphasised four different performance 
measures in a trend statement: (profit before income tax (normalised), profit after tax (normalised) along 
with both EBIT (including abnormal costs) and EBITDA (including abnormal costs).  Giving 
prominence to all these measures as well as adjustments to “bottom line” NPAT impacts on the integrity 
of earnings (Young, 2014). 
An encouraging result is that in 2014 all but five of the non-GAAP reporting companies prepared 
reconciliations of adjustments to GAAP earnings (Table 5, Panel D).  Most companies disclosed a 
numerical reconciliation between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. The majority of reconciliations are 
provided in a tabular format moving from the non-GAAP earnings to GAAP earnings figures.  The 
reconciliations provide appropriate descriptions of the adjustments along with prior year comparatives 
and avoid the use of the term “one-off” adjustments with companies preferring to use the term “non-
recurring” instead.   
An improved trend noted in 2014 is that reconciliations are not only appearing in the 
directors/management commentaries but also in the notes to the financial statements with 
accompanying explanations.  This is a positive result as prior research suggests that the disclosure of 
reconciliations of GAAP to non-GAAP earnings can reduce the emphasis non-sophisticated investors 
give to non-GAAP earnings (Elliott, 2006).  The improved transparency of providing high quality 
reconciliations also increases the likelihood that sophisticated investors such as analysts will rely on the 
non-GAAP earnings information in assessing earnings performance of a firm and reduce mispricing of 
securities (Elliot, 2006; Aubert and Grudnitski, 2014).  These results are consistent with improvement 
in the quality of reconciliations found with the implementation of SEC Regulation G in the United 
States (Zhang and Zheng, 2011).   
However, the quality of the reconciliations can be improved by companies disclosing where the 
non-GAAP information is derived.  Adjustments to GAAP earnings should be able to be retraced to the 
audited financial statements or details provided of how the adjustments are calculated. This would 
improve users’ perceptions of the reliability of the measure.   
The intention of the guidelines is to ensure that “undue prominence, emphasis or authority is not 
given to non-GAAP financial information” (FMA, 2012, p. 9).  The emphasis given to non-GAAP 
earnings relative to GAAP earnings has diminished over the three year period.  Overall, the results 
suggest a positive trend of managers being more balanced in the discussion of non-GAAP and non-
GAAP earnings in annual reports. 
To summarise the results indicate that the FMA Guidance Note improved the quality of 
information presented about non-GAAP earnings although areas of improvement are still required.   
 
6. Conclusion 
The disclosure of non-GAAP information is common practice for many listed companies.  Capital 
market regulators have adopted different approaches for improving the quality of reporting.  Regulators 
have tried to balance the desire of companies to provide additional information to the market about 
earnings against the potential to mislead users and undermine confidence in capital markets. In New 
Zealand, the approach of the FMA was to issue a Guidance Note.  
This study examines the impact of the FMA Guidance Note introduced in 2012 on the disclosure 
of non-GAAP earnings by New Zealand listed companies.   The study identifies trends in non-GAAP 
reporting for three successive years from 2012 to 2014.  The findings from the study show that there 
has been little change in the number of companies disclosing non-GAAP earnings since the introduction 
of the Guidance Note. Around one in five New Zealand listed companies disclosing non-GAAP 
earnings and this has remained consistent over the three year period.   
Data is collected from annual reports applying a disclosure and prominence index.  The mean 
disclosure score index increased from 5.89 in 2012 to 7.26 in 2014 showing that compliance with the 
disclosure guidelines has improved significantly over that time.  The mean prominence score increased 
7 
 
from 2.49 in 2012 to 2.74 in 2014 indicating the relative reporting emphasis given to GAAP earnings 
compared with non-GAAP earnings has improved.  Although there was media attention to improve 
disclosure practices, it is fair to say that the FMA Guidance Note has had a positive impact.   
The results identify areas for further improvement.  Non-GAAP earnings disclosures need to be 
supported with information on the nature and purpose of the adjustments to earnings as well as linking 
adjustments to the financial statements or to the notes to the financial statements.  The use of multiple 
non-GAAP earning measures can result in a lack of comparability and comprehension of financial 
information and diminish its usefulness. 
In conclusion, the findings suggest that the introduction of the FMA Guidance Note has changed 
the reporting of non-GAAP information by New Zealand listed companies.  Overall, companies 
reporting non-GAAP information are complying more with the disclosure criteria and giving more 
emphasis to reporting GAAP earns compared with non-GAAP earnings.  The policy approach taken by 
the FMA has in the short term had a positive impact on disclosure behaviour without the need for 
regulatory intervention. 
. 
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Table 1. Financial Market Authority Guidelines on Presentation of non-GAAP Information 
 
 Criteria   
1. Why information is useful Directors must explain why disclosure of non-GAAP earnings is 
useful to investors. 
2. Lack of prominence Non-GAAP earnings is to be disclosed to NOT give it undue 
prominence, emphasis or authority. 
3. Appropriate label Non-GAAP earnings must be labelled appropriately to clearly 
differentiate it from GAAP earnings.  
4. Calculation  There must be a clear narrative explanation of how non-GAAP 
earnings is calculated. 
5. Reconciliation  A reconciliation of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings information 
is to be disclosed. How non-GAAP earnings is calculated is to be 
explained. Significant GAAP adjustments are to be disclosed 
separately and linked to the financial statements. 
6. Consistency  Non-GAAP earnings is to be calculated consistently.  Any 
variation in the calculation is to be explained, along with reasons 
and the financial impact of the change  
7. Adjustments  For each non-GAAP earnings adjustment, the corresponding 
item must be adjusted in comparative information. 
8. Unbiased The non-GAAP earnings measure must be unbiased. If should 
not over (under) state good (bad) news to the market. 
9. One-off items Non-GAAP adjustments are not to be referred to as “one-off” if 
they have occurred in the past and are likely to occur in the 
future  
10. Audited or reviewed  A clear statement is to be made if non-GAAP financial 
information is taken from audited or reviewed financial 
statements. 
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Table 2. Population and Sample  
 
 2012 2013 2014 
NZX All Index companies in 2014 114 114 114 
Less overseas companies -2 -2 -2 
Less companies listed/delisted  -13 -7 -3 
Less company with lack of information - -1 -1 
Total Sample  99 104 108 
Non-GAAP earnings reported  57 (58%) 
57 
(55%) 
57 
(53%) 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 2014 
 
Panel A – Companies consistently reporting non-GAAP earnings (n=57)  
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25 50 75 Min Max Comparison 
Means  
Panel A and B 
p-values 
Market capitalisation (000) 974,044 1,375,774 97,183 455,446 1,156,786 4,490 6,060,003 
10.019** 
20.000** 
Total assets (000) 1,238,043 1,709,800 134,940 453,885 1,789,414 5,692 6,941,000 
10.030* 
20.000** 
Total liabilities (000) 623,964 930,053 55,138 200,980 698,496 2,284 3,531,313 
10.045* 
20.000** 
Total equity (000) 614,079 846,111 71,812 249,060 793,152 3,408 3,597,000 
10.036* 
20.001** 
Net profit after tax (000) 70,504 99,908 3,560 41,094 99,919 -79,429 460,000 
10.002** 
20.001** 
Loss 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1 
10.085 
20.085 
Total liabilities/Total assets  0.47 0.15 0.38 0.47 0.57 0.11 0.80 
10.601 
20.029* 
NPAT/Total assets 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.07 -0.62 0.57 
10.033* 
20.030* 
Market to book 1.95 1.45 0.98 1.47 2.32 0.48 7.77 
10.323 
20.387 
1 comparing the means of two independent groups and 2Mann-Whitney test .*5% and **1% significance level 
 
 
Panel B – Companies not reporting/consistently not reporting non-GAAP earnings (n=51)  
 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
25 50 75 Min Max 
Market capitalisation (000) 441,919 919,623 17,576 124,728 303,897 337 4,981,749 
Total assets (000) 601,477 1,279,196 12,169 130,469 476,886 88 5,850,000 
Total liabilities (000) 300,433 725,965 4,620 29,761 135,653 256 3,978,000 
Total equity (000) 301,044 681,714 10,776 87,703 282,972 -16,925 4,218,000 
Net profit after tax (000) 21,974 50,933 -112 7,169 19,153 -35,546 262,000 
Loss 0.27 0.45 0 0 0 0  
Total liabilities/Total 
assets  0.53 0.87 0.19 0.38 0.54 0.004 5.79 
NPAT/Total assets -0.05 0.27 -0.02 0.04 0.06 -1.44 0.42 
Market to book -77.99 572.36 0.83 1.21 2.64 -4,085.13 19.75 
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Table 4. Disclosure and Prominence Scores (n=57) 
 
Panel A – Disclosure Scores 
Companies Disclosure Score† Annual Change p-values 
 2012 2013 2014 2012-2013 2013-2014 2012-2013 2013-2014 
Mean Score 5.89 6.46 7.26 0.57 0.80 10.003 10.000 
      20.001 20.000 
Standard Dev 1.61 1.32 1.22     
Median Score 6.00 7.00 7.00 1.00 0.00   
Sum 336 368 414 32 46   
Maximum 8 8 9     
Minimum 1 3 3     
Notes:  †Maximum score for disclosure is 10; 1means of paired samples and 2Wilcoxon signed rank test with 1% significance level.  
 
 
Panel B – Lack of Prominence Scores 
Companies Lack of Prominence Score† Annual Change p-values 
 2012 2013 2014 2012-2013 2013-2014 2012-2013 2013-2014 
Mean Score 2.49 2.39 2.74 -0.10 0.35 10.293 10.014 
      20.334 20.015 
Standard Dev 1.12 1.10 1.06     
Median Score 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00   
Sum 142 136 156 -6 20   
Maximum 4 4 4     
Minimum 1 1 1     
Notes: † Scores for prominence range from 1 to 4.; 1means of paired samples and 2Wilcoxon signed rank test with 5% significance level. 
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Table 5. Analysis of Disclosure Score Information  
 
Panel A – Disclosure Scores by Category N=57 
    Direction  
  No. of companies 
meeting criteria 
2012 to 2013  2013 to 2014 
 Criteria 2012 2013 2014 Decrease Increase No change 1 No Change 0 Decrease Increase No change 
1 
No 
change  
0 
1.  Why information is 
useful 
13 19 29 2 8 11 36 - 10 19 28 
3.  Appropriate label 57 57 57 - - 57 - - - 57 - 
4.  Calculation 36 39 46 - 5 34 18 1 8 38 10 
5.  Reconciliation  49 51 52 - 3 48 6 - 1 51 5 
6.  Consistency  45 52 54 - 6 46 5 - 2 52 3 
7.  Adjustments  44 51 54 - 6 45 6 - 3 51 3 
8.  Unbiased 44 45 52 1 2 43 11 - 7 45 5 
9.  One-off items  48 48 53 - 1 47 9 1 6 47 3 
10.  Audited or reviewed  5 7 15 - 2 5 50 1 9 6 41 
Decrease a reduction in a company’s disclosure score from 1 to 0; Increase an improvement in a company’s disclosure score from 0 to 1; 
No Change 1 company has met the disclosure criteria for two consecutive years; No change 0 company has not met the disclosure criteria 
for two consecutive years 
 
 
Panel B – Criterion 1. Why information is useful1 
 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
Better measure of operations or more indicative of core business 
results 
6 7 9 22 
Useful for investors and/or other users 4 9 14 27 
Used by management for internal reporting purposes 2 7 8 17 
Improves consistency and/or comparability 1 1 2 4 
Used to assign dividend distribution and debt covenant requirements 5 5 10 20 
Sub-total  18 29 43 90 
No justification 44 38 28 110 
Total 62 67 71 200 
1Some companies gave more than one justification 
 
Panel C – Criterion 4. Calculation 
 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
Explanation within directors or management commentary 20 16 16 52 
Explanation by footnote  16 23 30 69 
Sub-total  36 39 46 121 
No explanation 21 18 11 50 
Total 57 57 57 171 
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Panel D – Criterion 5. Reconciliation  
 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
Side by side 1 1 1 3 
Move from GAAP to non-GAAP earnings 15 20 20 55 
Move from non-GAAP to GAAP earnings 33 30 31 94 
Sub-total  49 51 52 152 
No reconciliation 8 6 5 19 
Total 57 57 57 171 
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Appendix One. Disclosure Index  
 FMA Guideline Coding Reference  
1 Why information is useful  Directors must explain why disclosure of 
non-GAAP earnings is useful to investors. 
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes; 0=No 
Sub-coding  
Code statements. The statements can cover more than one of the 
categories below: 
1. better measure of operations or more indicative of core 
business results  
2. 2 useful to investors and/or other users  
3. used by management for internal purposes 
4. improves consistency and/or comparability 
5. used for assign dividend distribution and debt covenant 
requirements 
6. No justification 
7. Other  
Webber et al. (2013) 
3 Appropriate label Non-GAAP earnings must be labelled 
appropriately to clearly differentiate it from 
GAAP earnings.  
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes –non-GAAP labelled consistently; otherwise 0 
Sub-coding  
Classify the terminology given to the non-GAAP earnings figure 
1. Non-GAAP earnings 
2. Core earnings 
3. Adjusted earnings 
4. Underlying earnings 
5. Earnings after adjustments 
6. Normalised 
7. Other Label 
Label used consistently Yes/No 
 
4 Calculation  There must be a clear explanation of how 
non-GAAP earnings is calculated. 
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes if calculation is explained; otherwise 0 explained 
Sub-coding  
Classify how the explanation was given: 
1. Explanation within narrative of directors or management 
commentary 
2. Explanation within narrative plus support from director 
internal policy  
3. Explanation by footnote 
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 FMA Guideline Coding Reference  
4(a) Reconciliation with GAAP financials  A reconciliation of non-GAAP and GAAP 
information is to be disclosed.  
 
 
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes if reconciliation is given explained; 0= if no reconciliation  
Sub-coding  
1. Side by side 
2. Move from GAAP to non-GAAP showing the adjustments 
3. Move from non-GAAP to GAAP showing the adjustments 
4. Other  
Marques (2010)  
4(b) Significant adjustments explained Significant adjustments in the calculation of 
non-GAAP earnings are to be disclosed 
separately and linked to the financial 
statements. 
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes if adjustments can be identified in the financial statements 
or calculation shown; otherwise 0  
 
4 Consistency  Non-GAAP earnings is to be calculated 
consistently.  Any variation in the calculation 
is to be explained, along with reasons and the 
financial impact of the change. 
Disclosure Score 
1 =Same adjustments as prior year, otherwise, 0  
 
 
5 Adjustments  For each non-GAAP earnings adjustment, the 
corresponding item must be adjusted in 
comparative information. 
Disclosure Score 
1=Yes, 0=No 
 
6 Unbiased Non-GAAP earnings measures should not 
over (under)state good (bad) news to the 
market. 
Disclosure Score  
1=Neutral: non-GAAP earning presented in an unbiased way in 
reference to company performance.    
0=Good news (Bad news): non-GAAP earnings presented in a 
positive (negative) way in reference to the company’s 
performance 
 
 
7 One-off items  Non-GAAP adjustments are not to be 
referred to as “one-off” if they have occurred 
in the past and are likely to occur in the 
future.  
Disclosure Score 
1=Recurring items are not referred to as “one-off” items , 0 
otherwise 
 
8 Audited or reviewed  A clear statement is to be made if non-GAAP 
financial information is taken from audited or 
reviewed financial statements. 
Disclosure Score 
1= a clear statement as to audited or reviewed financial 
information, otherwise, 0  
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Appendix Two. Prominence Index  
 FMA Guideline Coding Reference  
2 Lack of prominence Non-GAAP earnings is to be disclosed to 
NOT give it undue prominence, emphasis or 
authority. 
Disclosure score 1 to 4 
1. Appearance in headline: Non-GAAP earnings in a headline 
of the directors’ report and management commentary but 
NOT GAAP earnings. 
Appearance in graphical presentation: Non-GAAP earnings is 
reported in a graphic in directors report and management 
commentary but NOT GAAP earnings.  
2. Pro Forma dominates: Discussion of non-GAAP earnings 
clearly takes precedence over GAAP earnings. These include: 
2.1 where non-GAAP earnings is mentioned in the first 
page of the directors or management commentary but 
NOT GAAP earnings, or 
2.2 where commentary on performance given throughout 
the directors report and management commentary 
(press release) relates primarily to non-GAAP earnings 
with few comments on GAAP earnings, or  
2.3 GAAP earnings is presented but not commented in 
directors or management commentary, or 
2.4 GAAP profit figure and reconciliation ARE NOT 
contained in the directors or management commentary 
3 GAAP and non-GAAP earnings are equally prominent: 
Discussion of both measures is mentioned at the same rate. 
For example, whenever a pro forma measure is mentioned, 
the equivalent GAAP measure is also mentioned. 
4 GAAP dominates: Discussion of GAAP earnings clearly take 
precedence over non-GAAP earnings. These include 
4.1 where GAAP earnings is mentioned in first page in 
the directors or management commentary but NOT 
non-GAAP earnings, or 
4.2 where commentary on performance given throughout 
the directors report and management commentary 
relates primarily to GAAP earnings with few 
comments on non-GAAP earnings, or  
4.3 Non-GAAP earnings is presented but not commented 
in directors or management commentary, or 
4.4 GAAP profit figure and reconciliation ARE 
contained in the directors or management 
commentary 
Entwistle et al. (2006) 
and FMA(2012)  
17 
 
References  
Aubert, F, and Grudnitski, G. (2014), “The role of reconciliation quality in limited mispricing on non-
GAAP earnings announcements by EURO STOXX Firm”, Advances in Accounting, 
incorporating Advances in International Accounting, Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 154-167. 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2011), “Disclosing non-IFRS information”, 
available at: http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg230-published-9-
december-2011.pdf/$file/rg230-published-9-december-2011.pdf  (accessed 13 March 2014). 
Barth, M., Gow, I. and Taylor, D. (2012), "Why do pro forma and street Earnings not reflect changes 
in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R”, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 17. No. 3, pp. 526-
562. 
Baumaker, M., Biggs, P., McVay, S. E., and Pierce, J. (2014), “The disclosure of non-GAAP earnings 
following regulation G: An analysis of transitory gains”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 28 No. 1, 
pp. 77-92. 
Bhattacharya, N., Black, E., Christensen, T. and Larson, C. (2003), “Assessing the relative 
informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating earnings”, Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 36 Nos. 1-3, pp. 285-319. 
Bhattacharya, N., Black, E., Christensen, T. and Mergenthaler, R. (2004), “Empirical evidence on recent 
trends in pro forma reporting”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 27-43. 
Bhattacharya, N., Black, E., Christensen, T. and Mergenthaler, R. (2007), “Who trades on proforma 
earnings information?”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 82 No. 3, pp. 581-619. 
Black, D. E. and Christensen, T. (2009), “US managers’ use of ‘pro forma’ adjustments to meet strategic 
earning targets”, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 36 No. 3, pp. 297-326. 
Black, D. E., Black, E. L., Christensen, T. and Heninger, W. G. (2012), “Has the regulation of pro forma 
reporting in the US changed investors’ perceptions of pro forma earnings disclosures?”,  Journal 
of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 39 No. 7, pp. 876-904. 
Brown, L. and Sivakumar, K. (2003), “Comparing the relevance of two operating income measures”, 
Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 561-572. 
Brown, N., Christensen, T., Elliott, W. and Mergenthaler, R. (2012), “Investor sentiment and pro forma 
earnings disclosures”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 1-40. 
Botosan, C. A. (1997), “Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 
72 No. 3, pp. 323–349. 
Botosan, C. A. (2004), “Discussion of a framework for the analysis of firm risk communication”, The 
International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 289–295. 
Bowen, R., Davis, A. and Matsumoto, D. (2005), “Emphasis on pro forma versus GAAP earnings in 
quarterly press releases: Determinants, SEC intervention, and market reactions”, The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 80 No. 4, pp. 1011-1038. 
Cameron, R., Percy, M., and Stevenson-Clarke, P. (2012), “Do large Australian companies emphasise 
non-GAAP financial measures over statutory net profit (GAAP) in annual reports?”, JASSA The 
Finsia Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 13-19. 
Curtis, A., Mc Vay, S., and Whipple, B. (2014). “The disclosure of non-GAAP earnings information in 
the presence of transitory gains”. The Accounting Review, Vol. 89 No. 3, pp. 933-958. 
Doyle, J., Lundholm, R. and Soliman, M. (2003), “The predictive value of expenses excluded from pro 
forma earnings”, Review of Accounting Studies”, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 145-174.  
Doyle, J., Jennings, J. and Soliman, M. (2013), “Do managers define non-GAAP earnings to meet or 
beat analyst forecasts?”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 56 No. 1, pp. 40-56. 
18 
 
Elliott, W. (2006), “Are investors influenced by pro forma emphasis and reconciliations in earnings 
announcements?”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 81 No. 1, pp. 113-133.  
Entwistle, G. M. Feltham, G. D. and Mbagwu, C. (2006), “Financial reporting and the reporting of pro 
forma earnings”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 39-55. 
Epping, L. and Wilder, W. (2011), “U.S.-listed foreign firms’ non-GAAP financial performance 
disclosure behaviour”, Journal of International Accounting Research, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 77-96. 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group. (2009), “Performance reporting: A European 
discussion paper”, available at http://www.efrag.org/files/ProjectDocuments/PAAinE%20-
%20Performance%20Reporting%20MARCH%202009/March%202009%20European%20Disc
ussion%20Paper%20on%20Performance%20Reporting.pdf   
European Securities and Markets Authority. (2015), “ESMA guidelines on alternative measures”, 
available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-publishes-final-
guidelines-alternative-performance-measures  
External Reporting Board (2016), “Information needs of users of New Zealand capital markets entity 
reports”, available at 
https://www.xrb.govt.nz/Site/Research/Chairmans_Research_Introduction.aspx  
Financial Markets Authority (2012), “Guidance note: Disclosing non-GAAP financial information”, 
available at http://www.fma.govt.nz/media/1027578/guidance_note_-_disclosing_non-
gaap_financial_information.pdf. 
Fredrickson, J. and Miller, J. (2003), “The effects of pro forma earnings disclosure on analysts’ and 
non-professional investors’ equity valuation judgements”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 79 No. 
3, pp. 769-795. 
Graham, J.R., C.R. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal, 2005, The economic implications of corporate financial 
reporting, Journal of Accounting and Economics 40, 3-73.  
Guillamon-Saorin, E., Isidro, H. and Marques, A. (2014), “Impression management and non-GAAP 
disclosure in earnings announcements”, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2011889  
Heflin, F and Hsu, C. (2008), “The impact of SEC’s regulation on non-GAAP disclosure”, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 46, Nos. 2-3, pp. 349-365.  
Hitz, J. (2010), “Press release disclosure of ‘pro forma’ earnings metrics by large German corporations 
– Empirical evidence and regulatory recommendation”, Accounting in Europe, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 
63-68. 
Hooks, J. and van Staden. C. J. (2011), “Evaluating environmental disclosures: The relationship 
between quality and extent measures”, The British Accounting Review, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 200–
213. 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (2014), “Proposed statement on Non-GAAP 
financial measures’’, available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD447.pdf 
Isidro, H. and Marques, A. (2015), “The role of institutional and economic factors in the strategic use 
of non-GAAP disclosures to beat earnings benchmarks”, The European Accounting Review, Vol. 
24 No. 1, pp. 95-128.  
Johnson, A., Percy, M., Stevenson-Clarke, P. and Cameron, R. (2014), “The impact of disclosure of 
non-GAAP earnings in Australian annual reports on non-sophisticated users”, The Australian 
Accounting Review, Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 207-217. 
Kolev, K., Marquardt, C. and McVay, S. (2008), “SEC scrutiny and the evolution of non-GAAP 
reporting”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 83 No. 1, pp. 157-184. 
Larcker, D. F. and Tayan, B. (2010), “Pro forma earnings: What's wrong with GAAP?” Rock Center 
for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and 
19 
 
Controversies in Corporate Governance No. CGRP-09, 20 August, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678066). 
Leuz, C. and Wysocki, P. D. (2008), “Economic consequences of financial reporting and disclosure 
regulation: A review and suggestions for future research”, available at 
SRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105398 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1105398. 
Lougee, B. and Marquardt, C. (2004), “Earnings informativeness and strategic disclosure: An empirical 
examination of ‘pro forma earnings’”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 79 No. 3, pp. 769-795. 
Marques, A. (2006), “SEC Interventions and the frequency and usefulness of non-GAAP financial 
measures”, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 549-574. 
Marques, A. (2010), “Disclosure strategies among S&P 500 Firms: Evidence on the disclosure of non-
GAAP financial measures and financial statements in earnings press releases”, British 
Accounting Review, Vol. 42 No. 2, pp. 119-131. 
McLaughlin, T. (2010), “Adopting IFRS made more sense than some pro formas”, The Dominion Post, 
28 December, p. 5. 
Rainsbury, E., Hart, C. and Buranavityawut, N. (2015), “GAAP-adjusted earnings disclosures by New 
Zealand companies”, Pacific Accounting Review, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp. 329-352. 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, available at https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf. 
Securities and Exchange Commission. (2003), “Regulation G, Final rule: Conditions for use of non-
GAAP financial measures”, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8176.htm. 
Srinivasan, S. (2005), “Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: Evidence from 
Accounting restatements and audit committee members”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 
43 No. 2, pp. 291–334. 
Webber, S., Nichols, N., Street, D. and Cereola, S. (2013), “Non-GAAP adjustments to net income 
appearing in the earnings releases of the S&P 100: An analysis of frequency of occurrence, 
materiality and rationale”, Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 236-51. 
Young, S. (2014), “The drivers, consequences and policy implications of non-GAAP earnings 
reporting”, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 44 No. 4, pp. 444-465. 
Zhang, H. and Zheng, L. (2011), “The valuation impact of reconciling pro forma earnings to GAAP 
earnings”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 51 Nos. 1-2, pp. 186-202.  
 
20 
 
